numbers of migrant birds that move between Asia and Alaska
January 6th, 2009Approximate numbers of migrant birds that move between Asia and Alaska
| Number | Percent of Total | |
| Waterfowl | 561,000 | 8.5% |
| Loons | 55,000 | 0.8% |
| Shorebirds/Gulls | 1,226,000 | 18.5% |
| Landbirds | 4,745,000 | 71.8% |
| Raptors/Owls | 25,000 | 0.4% |
| Totals | 6,612,000 | 100% |
| Waterfowl | Shorebirds/Gulls | ||
| King eider | 200,000 | Dunlin | 500,000 |
| Brant | 10,000 | Sharp-tailed sandpiper | 25,000 |
| Steller's eider | 10,000 | Bar-tailed godwit | 135,000 |
| Emperor goose | 5,000 | Ruddy turnstone | 15,000 |
| Mallard | 100,000 | Pectoral sandpiper | 200,000 |
| Pintail | 100,000 | Pacific golden-plover | 40,000 |
| Eurasian widgeon | 1,000 | Buff-breasted sandpiper | 3,000 |
| Long-tailed duck | 100,000 | Western sandpiper | 105,000 |
| Red-breasted merganser | 10,000 | Baird's sandpiper | 3,000 |
| Harlequin duck | 20,000 | Red knot | 37,500 |
| Common eider | 5,000 | Long-billed dowitcher | 125,000 |
| Loons | Rock sandpiper | 12,500 | |
| Yellow-billed loon | 5,000 | Aleutian tern | 10,000 |
| Red-throated loon | 10,000 | Glaucous gull | 10,000 |
| Pacific loon | 40,000 | Glaucous-winged gull | 5,000 |
| Landbirds | Raptors/Owls | ||
| Arctic warbler | 2,700,000 | Gyrfalcon | 5,000 |
| Bluethroat | 100,000 | Peregrin falcon | 5,000 |
| White wagtail | 10,000 | Snowy owl | 5,000 |
| Eastern yellow wagtail | 1,400,000 | Short-eared owl | 10,000 |
| Northern wheatear | 300,000 | ||
| Red-throated pipit | 5,000 | ||
| Redpoll species | 120,000 | ||
| Lapland longspur | 100,000 | ||
| Snow bunting | 10,000 | ||
http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/avian_influenza/migrants_tables.html
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020803/H5N1_Alaska_Japan.html
Conservation groups have described the screening of 350,000 fecal samples from wild birds. Not surprisingly, the vast majority were negative.
Conservation groups, including those in Alaska, looking for H5N1 in healthy wild birds is well into the "fox guarding the hen house" category.
The more I read about '05 Qinghai Lake, the more questions I have. The annual Qinghai Bike Race in July stages one leg from the Qinghai Lake Hotel to Bird Island. Less than 6 weeks after the town was quanantined and sprayed, cyclists from all over the world were at the lake. And apparently cycling around Qinghai when the Boxun reports were flooding in.
Incidently, the bike race is expected to draw in an estimated 2 million people this year.
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020802/H5N1_Alaska_Tell.htmlDon't Ask Don't Tell H5N1 Surveillance in Alaska
Recombinomics Commentary 13:51
May 2, 2008
No. of samples: Total of 400 samples, including 200 fecal samples from nesting birds and 200 cloacal swabs from brood flocks.
Sampling locations: Samples will be collected at different Islands in the Aleutian chain, including Buldir, Shemya and Agattu where Alaska Maritime NWR will have crews in place for seabird monitoring.
Sampling timeframe: Primary time frames will be late May to early June when birds are on nests, and late July and early August when adults with young are flightless.
Sample demographics: Geese of all age and sex classes will be sampled. Fecal samples of nesting birds will only include adults.
Methods of capture: Samples of nesting birds will likely be restricted to fecal specimens obtained in areas where nesting birds have recently foraged. Flightless birds will be captured be a field crew on Buldir Island by using long-handled nets.
Other targeted species: Sampling during the nesting period on Agattu will be done in conjunction with sampling for Common Eiders. Asiatic species are abundant on the Aleutian Islands and it may be possible to obtain fecal samples from a number of them.
The above comments are from the public protocol (http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/avian_influenza/species/species.php?code=ACGO) for collecting samples from Aleutian Cackling Geese. These procedures have become of interest because of recent H5N1 positives in South Korea (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04220801/H5N1_Korea_P_P.html), southeastern Russia (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04110803/H5N1_Primorsky_Confirmed.html), and northwestern Japan (see satellite map (http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=106484775090296685271.00044622013f3bba138f7&t=h&ll=41.640078,138.295898&spn=57.808186,84.550781&z=3)). The most recent collections in northeastern Japan are the closest confirmed (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020801/H5N1_Japan_Alaska.html) H5N1 cases relative to North America. The bird flu in Hokkaido (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05010802/Hokkaido_Swan.html) is 800 miles northeast of the record outbreaks in South Korea and 800 miles southwest of the Aleutian Islands. The Aleutian Cackling geese winter in Japan and then fly to the Aleutian Islands in late spring, raising the possibility of transport of H5N1 to North America.
However, sampling of fecal samples and cloacal swabs is not an efficient method (http://rawstory.com/news/2006/Saliva_swabs_for_bird_flu_virus_mor_12112006.html) for detecting H5N1 in live wild birds. The H5N1 in South Korea last season was the clade 2.2.3 Uvs Lake strain, which was found in the massive Uvs Lake outbreak in wild birds in the summer of 2006. It is likely that the H5N1 in South Korea (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04130801/H5N1_ROK_Migration.html), Russia, and Japan is also clade 2.2 and is likely clade 2.2.3 Uvs Lake strain.
It has been known for several years that H5N1 levels are higher in pharyngeal swabs (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/03240802/H5N1_Qinghai_Issues.html). These higher levels are even more applicable to clade 2.2, since the vast majority of clade 2.2 isolates have had PB2 E627K, a polymorphism found in seasonal flu, and associated with higher polymerase activity at lower temperatures (33 C). Consequently levels will be higher in nose and throat swabs where the body temperature of the host is lower.
The latest detection of H5N1 in northeastern Asia has much in common with events in 2005 in central Asia. On May 9, 2005 dead bar headed geese were noted at Qinghai Lake, the largest lake in China. Although the initial reports were on 178 bar headed geese, the OIE report filed near the end of May included five long range migratory bird species. In June, China reported H5N1 on farms in northeast China, on a line connecting Qinghai Lake to Chany Lake in southern Siberia. By mid-July H5N1 was reported at farms surrounding Chany Lake. Sequence analysis showed that the H5N1 was clade 2.2 (Qinghai strain)., including H5N1 from a healthy crested grebe.
The Chany Lake outbreak was followed by an outbreak at Erhel Lake in Mongolia in August. H5N1 was again detected in dead birds and was also clade 2.2, but conservation groups failed to detect H5N1 in live wild birds when fecal samples and cloacal swabs were collected. These data highlighted the shortfalls of this approach, but these same groups have now tested 350,000 fecal samples, which are largely negative.
Recent lab controled infections of a number of wild bird species also showed similar results. H5N1 could be detected in pharyngeal swabs but was rare in cloacal swabs. Similarly, H5N1 was not detected in the intestines. Isolation of H5N1 was limited to a single 24 hour collection, highlighting the fact that the majority of daily collections failed to yield H5N1 isolates, even under ideal lab conditions.
The surveillance of H5N1 in North America has produced similar results (http://wildlifedisease.nbii.gov/ai/LPAI-Table.jsp). There are 46 samples listed that tested positive for H5N1. However, virus was isolated from 20 of the samples, while only 11 of the 20 were H5N1, which were low path H5N1. Thus, more than 75% of H5N1 positive samples fail to yield H5N1 virus, and in many instances the isolated virus did not have H5 or N1. All of these samples were from live (or hunter killed birds).
H5 was detected (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06160602/H5_PEI_Gosling.html) in a dead gosling on Prince Edward Island. Since low path H5N1 rarely kills waterfowl, the three goslings with neurological symptoms followed by rapid death were likely to have been clade 2.2 H5N1 positive. However, the sample (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06210603/H5_PCR_PEI.html) was held on Prince Edward Island for 10 days, and the degraded (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06210601/H5_Winnipeg_Failure.html) sample failed to yield a PCR positive or virus when shipped to the National labs in Winnipeg.
Although fecal samples do occasionally test positive for clade 2.2 H5N1 testing of 400 fecal or cloacal swabs is unlikely to yield positive data, even if these birds are H5N1 infected, because detection is limited to a very small time frame, even when pharyngeal swabs are collected.
Similar limited testing of fecal samples is planned for Japan, where all positives reported this season have been from dead or dying waterfowl. Therefore positive results from the surveillance in Japan is also likely to yield an over abundance of false negative.
This “don’t ask, don’t tell” (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04290802/H5N1_Japan_Tell.html) approach of H5N1 surveillance remains a cause for concern.
.
http://wildlifedisease.nbii.gov/ai/
From FOA's WILD BIRDS AND AVIAN INFLUENZA
An introduction to applied field research
and disease sampling techniques
5. Disease sampling procedures-
- Tracheal and cloacal swabs
- Blood sampling
- Faecal sampling
- References and information sources
TRACHEAL AND CLOACAL SWABS
Swabs taken from the cloaca (vent) or trachea can be used for viral cultures or reversetranscription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) to test for the presence of many viral pathogens, including AI viruses. While non-pathogenic AI viruses replicate primarily in the avian intestinal tract, recent strains of H5N1 HPAI viruses have been detected both from cloacal and tracheal/oropharyngeal samples. Research has revealed that, unlike other AI viruses, the H5N1 HPAI subtype replicates to higher levels and for longer periods in the respiratory tract compared to the gastrointestinal tract (Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2004, Hulse-Post et al. 2005). Furthermore, after experimental exposure, higher concentrations of the virus have been found in tracheal samples than in cloacal samples on any given day. Therefore, tracheal and cloacal swabs are currently the preferred samples for H5N1 surveillance in
wild birds.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a1521e/a1521e00.htm
None of this is new, and the groups collecting wild bird samples are well aware of this data. However, their recent presentation in Bangkok was on 350,000 FECAL samples, which was used to spoon feed media the nonsense on no H5N1 in wild birds.
H5N1 in wild birds REMAINS a political issue and the propaganda campaign has been active since Qingahi Lake (May, 2005).
This is a VERY old story.
http://wildlifedisease.nbii.gov/ai/LPAI-Table.jsp
45 samples H5N1 positive
20 of the above yielded viral isolates
11 of the above were low path H5N1
http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/avian_influenza/species/images/ACGO_DDewhurst.jpg Justification: A portion of the population of Aleutian Cackling Geese breeding on the Aleutian Islands may winter in Japan where they could possibly contract Asian H5N1, and the majority of geese breeding in the western Aleutians occupy islands visited by hundred of direct Asiatic migrant birds of a number of species directly from Asia annually.
Background:
Aleutian Cackling Geese breed on the western end of the Aleutian Islands (Byrd 1998). An eastern Asia taxon, formerly identified as a separate subspecies, B. c. asiatica, reportedly bred in the Komandorski and Kuril islands and wintered in Japan, but the population was wiped out by the 1940’s (Mowbray et al. 2002). Based on only a few specimens, asiatica is now considered identical, by several authorities synonymous, with B. h. leucopareia. Since the middle of the 20th century, only vagrant individuals of B. h. leucopareia and B. h. minima from North America have occurred in Korea and Japan. However breeding stock of B. h. leucopareia that originated from Buldir Island, have been reintroduced to the Kuril Islands and have been recorded wintering in Japan (N. Gerasimov, unpubl. data). The Aleutian Cackling Goose is of low rank of waterfowl species to make the final list of 26 species of concern for Asian H5N1 transmission in the National Plan, primarily because we have a poor understanding of movements between Alaska and Asia. Nevertheless, the likelihood of secondary contact with Asian H5N1 is high, given the plethora of Asian birds using the western Aleutians (25 species are annual through migrants, and more than 90 species occur less than annually). Like nearly every other species of waterfowl considered, the main threat of contacting the Asian H5N1 virus is from other species, or populations of the same species coming directly from Asia and carrying the virus to the continental U.S. Aleutian Cackling geese winter in California. Ranking Score: 11.0
Methods:
No. of samples: Total of 400 samples, including 200 fecal samples from nesting birds and 200 cloacal swabs from brood flocks.
Sampling locations: Samples will be collected at different Islands in the Aleutian chain, including Buldir, Shemya and Agattu where Alaska Maritime NWR will have crews in place for seabird monitoring.
Sampling timeframe: Primary time frames will be late May to early June when birds are on nests, and late July and early August when adults with young are flightless.
Sample demographics: Geese of all age and sex classes will be sampled. Fecal samples of nesting birds will only include adults.
Methods of capture: Samples of nesting birds will likely be restricted to fecal specimens obtained in areas where nesting birds have recently foraged. Flightless birds will be captured be a field crew on Buldir Island by using long-handled nets.
Other targeted species: Sampling during the nesting period on Agattu will be done in conjunction with sampling for Common Eiders. Asiatic species are abundant on the Aleutian Islands and it may be possible to obtain fecal samples from a number of them. Principal Investigator(s):
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Alaska Maritime NWR
Contact: Vernon Byrd
U.S. Geological Survey
Alaska Science Center
Contact: Margaret Petersen
Literature Cited:
Byrd, G. V. 1998. Current breeding status of the Aleutian Canada Goose, a recovering endangered species. Pp. 21-28 In Biology and management of Canada Geese (D.H. Rusch, M.D. Samuel, D. D. Humburg, and B. D. Sullivan, eds.). Mowbray, T. B., C. R. Ely, J. S. Sedinger, and R. E. Trost. 2002. Canada Goose (Branta canadensis). In The Birds of North America, No. 682 (A. Poole and F. Gill, eds.). The Birds of North America, Inc., Philadelphia, PA.
Asian H5N1 ranking criteria for Aleutian Cackling Geese, Branta hutchinsii leucopareia.
| Total of partial contact with Asia1 | Contact with known "hot spot"2 | Habitat used in Asia3 | Pop. in Alaska4 | Can samples be obtained? | Score |
| 1.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 11.0 |
| Small numbers breed on Commander Islands and winter in Asia | No known use of AI-infected areas | Breeds on Aleutian Islands in wet, grassy freshwater meadows | Approximately 70,000 birds in fall population | Could be difficult to obtain target number in Alaska | |
Distribution Map:
http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/avian_influenza/species/maps/Aleutian-Cackling-Geese-Map.jpg
http://alaska.usgs.gov/science/biology/avian_influenza/species/species.php?code=ACGO
June 18, 2008
Alaska pathway seems free of deadly bird flu
By Ned Rozell
Asian bird flu and its connection to Alaska was big news a few years ago, when dozens of Alaska scientists started checking birds migrating from Asia. So far, the news from the field is good.
"There are strains of avian flu here, but not of the deadly stuff‹thank goodness," said Greg Wilkinson of the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services.
The U.S. government spent millions in the last few years to enable biologists to capture migratory birds and swab their rear ends to search for signs of a deadly virus first found in Hong Kong in 1997. Since 2003, the Asian H5N1 virus has spread west across Asia to Europe and Africa, and has killed more than 240 people.
Alaska, so far, is clean.
"All agencies collectively sampled over 20,000 wild birds in Alaska, and the bottom line is that in 2006, we found garden-variety avian flu in 1.7 percent of those birds, and we didn't find any of the Asian H5N1," said Tom Rothe, the statewide waterfowl coordinator for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. "In 2007, we sampled over 12,000 birds and 0.7 percent had common, low-pathogen influenza. Nationwide, over 100,000 birds were sampled (in 2006 and 2007) and nobody found any Asian H5N1."
In 2008, Alaska researchers will again test about 12,000 birds, most of them waterfowl that can pick up flu viruses by ingesting water fouled with the feces or other bodily fluids of birds.
Jon Runstadler, a veterinarian and an assistant professor at UAF, is part of a team that has sampled 4,000 birds in Alaska since 2005 and 4,000 in the Russian Far East, Japan, and Mongolia since 2006.
"We found a lot of viruses, mostly in waterfowl, and most of those have come out of ducks in Minto Flats, which seems to be a relative hotspot for influenza," he said. "But we've not found any viruses that are highly pathogenic, and no H5N1."
This year, Runstadler and his colleagues are sampling birds at Minto Flats all summer, rather than just convenient periods to catch birds, such as when they are molting and lose their flight feathers.
"It's fading away in the media," Runstadler said of the hubbub over the H5N1 virus, but "most people studying influenza feel like there will be a pandemic, or a pandemic-like situation, at some point due to the fact that it's a virus that does unique things in the way it evolves and exists in the natural world."
The 1918 influenza virus that killed 50 million people‹and wiped out entire villages in Alaska‹was a bird flu that jumped to humans, which is why those in the know have paid attention to H5N1. Flu viruses are so mysterious that researchers think it's worthwhile to keep tabs on them, no matter that the present danger seems small.
"While H5N1 is currently the most likely candidate because it's out there causing problems and moving around, we don't really know whether H5N1 is going to cause a problem, or whether (a similar type of virus will cause a problem)," Runstadler said.
Why haven't Alaska scientists been finding infected birds here? The Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea might be acting as barriers to the deadly strain of flu that might be present in birds while they winter in Vietnam, Thailand, or Indonesia.
"Maybe they can't carry (the virus) that long," Rothe said. "Maybe they die before they get here, or the virus runs its course."
Whatever the reason the deadly virus isn't showing up here, scientists will keep checking birds as long as the funding arrives to do so.
"If Congress thinks it's still an important enough project, we'll keep testing birds," Rothe said.
© AlaskaReport News
This column is provided as a public service by the Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska Fairbanks, in cooperation with the UAF research community. Ned Rozell is a science writer at the institute.
Why is a sample from the throat better than a sample from the butt?PB2 E627K
That's a Willie Sutton question.
Thank you.
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showpost.php?p=72266&postcount=3 Briefly, PB2 E627K is a mammalian polymophism. Every H1, H2, or H3 isolated from a human going back to 1918 has E627K. It was in a few H5N1 human cases in 1997, then the only H7N7 fatality in 2003, then in more H5N1 cases in Vietnam and Thailand. Almost all human cases that were not H1, H2, or H3 that had E627k died as did the tigers and domestic cats in Thailand.
Sutton's law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutton's_law
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020803/H5N1_Alaska_Japan.htmlCommentary
H5N1 Surveillance Concerns in Japan and Alaska
Recombinomics Commentary 22:24
May 2, 2008
The detection of H5N1 in southeastern Russia (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04110803/H5N1_Primorsky_Confirmed.html) and northeastern Japan (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05010802/Hokkaido_Swan.html) has raised concerns of H5N1 migration into new regions. In the past H5N1 in central or eastern Russia was limited to southern Siberia near Chany Lake in Novosibirsk, or Uvs Lake in Mongolia. Although low path H5 has been detected in southeastern Russia near Lake Khanka in Russia or Xingkai in China, the first confirmed case of H5N1 was reported last month. Similarly, H5N1 in Japan was limited to central and southern regions. The confirmed H5N1 in Akita (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/04280801/H5_Japan_Swans.html) and suspected H5N1 in Hokkaido represent new areas and raise concerns that H5N1 is expanding its geographical reach into North America via the Aleutian Island (see satellite map (http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=106484775090296685271.00044622013f3bba138f7&t=h&ll=41.640078,138.295898&spn=57.808186,84.550781&z=3)).
There have not been any confirmed H5N1 outbreaks in North America, although the circumstances surrounding the H5 PCR positive (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06160602/H5_PEI_Gosling.html)dead gosling on Prince Edward Island suggest H5N1 may already be circulating in North America, but hasn’t been confirmed (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/06210601/H5_Winnipeg_Failure.html). The testing protocols in North American surveillance continue to raise concerns because testing of fecal samples or cloacal swabs is not sensitive, especially for clade 2.2, which is the H5N1 circulating in migratory birds.
The outbreaks in southeastern Russia and northwestern Japan are the closest confirmed H5N1 cases to North America. The case in Hokkaido is approximately 800 miles from the Aleutian Islands, which has focused attention of surveillance in Alaska (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020801/H5N1_Japan_Alaska.html). The public protocols indicate that testing will involve fecal samples and cloacal swabs (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020802/H5N1_Alaska_Tell.html), even though these approaches are likely to generate false negatives. Similarly, Japan plans to increase testing of fecal samples to 20-100 per site, which is also unlikely to detect H5N1.
The approaches are curious because the lack of sensitivity is well known. The failure of these approaches to detect H5N1 in live birds near dead and dying H5N1 positive waterfowl raised serious concerns over these approaches, and multiple studies have demonstrated that pharyngeal (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/03240802/H5N1_Qinghai_Issues.html) and throat swabs are more sensitive (http://www.recombinomics.com/News/03240802/H5N1_Qinghai_Issues.html) than cloacal swabs. Since the studies in Alaska include collection of cloacal swabs, the rationale behind not also taking pharyngeal or tracheal swabs is unclear.
Collection of more pharyngeal or tracheal swabs would be useful.
.
The issue is too serious for dishonesty to be accepted.
Otoh, I'm rather impressed with their world-wide organization (propaganda campaign). Maybe we can enlist them to work on the food crisis :)
Actually, Nature published the negative data in the "news" section and Promed has been running the "Wild Bird vs Trade" nonsense for years. The campaign is quite intense (I received a LARGE number of e-mails, and message boards exploded with new members right after Qinghai Lake in 2005), and on going.
http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=106484775090296685271.00044622013f3bba138f7&t=h&ll=41.640078,140.097656&spn=55.549249,108.28125&z=3
Nasal pharyngeal swabs.
PB2 E627K
Sampling locations: Samples will be collected at different Islands in the Aleutian chain, including Buldir, Shemya and Agattu where Alaska Maritime NWR will have crews in place for seabird monitoring.
Sampling timeframe: Primary time frames will be late May to early June when birds are on nests, and late July and early August when adults with young are flightless.
Sample demographics: Geese of all age and sex classes will be sampled. Fecal samples of nesting birds will only include adults.
Methods of capture: Samples of nesting birds will likely be restricted to fecal specimens obtained in areas where nesting birds have recently foraged. Flightless birds will be captured be a field crew on Buldir Island by using long-handled nets.
Other targeted species: Sampling during the nesting period on Agattu will be done in conjunction with sampling for Common Eiders. Asiatic species are abundant on the Aleutian Islands and it may be possible to obtain fecal samples from a number of them.
Detection of clade 2.2 in fecal or cloacal samples is in the abysmal range.
H5N1 in wild birds REMAINS a political issue and the propaganda campaign has been active since Qingahi Lake (May, 2005).
This is a VERY old story.
Does no one ask them openly why they are doing this? Surely there were people there who *knew* they were being fed nonsense.
The issue is too serious for dishonesty to be accepted.
Otoh, I'm rather impressed with their world-wide organization (propaganda campaign). Maybe we can enlist them to work on the food crisis :)
That's a Willie Sutton question.
Whats the best way to detect clade 2.2 in a live bird?
Why is a sample from the throat better than a sample from the butt?
Sutton's law http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutton's_law
The law is named after the bank robber Willie Sutton (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willie_Sutton), who supposedly answered a reporter inquiring why he robbed banks by saying "because that's where the money is."
The above is why nasal swabs should be collected when looking for H5N1 clade 2.2 (which is the H5N1 in migratory birds in South Korea, Japan, and Russia).
http://www.recombinomics.com/News/05020802/H5N1_Alaska_Tell.html
http://www.intrade.com/jsp/intrade/common/c_cd.jsp?conDetailID=594848&z=1209723573406
From FOA's WILD BIRDS AND AVIAN INFLUENZA
An introduction to applied field research
and disease sampling techniques
5. Disease sampling procedures-
- Tracheal and cloacal swabs
- Blood sampling
- Faecal sampling
- References and information sources
TRACHEAL AND CLOACAL SWABS
Swabs taken from the cloaca (vent) or trachea can be used for viral cultures or reversetranscription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) to test for the presence of many viral pathogens, including AI viruses. While non-pathogenic AI viruses replicate primarily in the avian intestinal tract, recent strains of H5N1 HPAI viruses have been detected both from cloacal and tracheal/oropharyngeal samples. Research has revealed that, unlike other AI viruses, the H5N1 HPAI subtype replicates to higher levels and for longer periods in the respiratory tract compared to the gastrointestinal tract (Sturm-Ramirez et al. 2004, Hulse-Post et al. 2005). Furthermore, after experimental exposure, higher concentrations of the virus have been found in tracheal samples than in cloacal samples on any given day. Therefore, tracheal and cloacal swabs are currently the preferred samples for H5N1 surveillance in
wild birds.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a1521e/a1521e00.htm
#If you have any other info about this subject , Please add it free.# |
